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PROF. GOLDIE: I hope you feel sufficiently challenged by my two
rather controversial quotations.• They were intended to stimulate some
juices on the panel and particularly directed towards you, Professor
Gordon, and Dr. Ghobashy. Would you care to take "Jesting Pilate" or
Susan Sontag's "husbands and lovers?"
PROF. GORDON: I will take up your comment that there is recognized
and applicable international law. Whether there was historically a generally accepted rule of international law applicable to expropriations
would not seem particularly relevant because there certainly has not
been such a recognized doctrine since the late 1930's, commencing with
the Mexican expropriation of foreign petroleum interests. There exists
a belief by many persons in the less developed sectors of the world that
there has never been established any international law regarding expropriations in which those nations have had an opportunity to participate.
Interestingly, the Mexican government, in the correspondence between
the Mexican Foreign Minister and the United States Department of
State, indicated that although Mexico rejected the Secretary of State's
comments regarding an international law relating to compensation,
Mexico's constitution, in accordance with article 27, required the pay*L. F. E. Goldie is Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program,
College of Law, Syracuse University.
Michael W . Gordon is Professor of Law and Director, Mexican Summer Law Program,
College of Law, University of Florida.
Fred B . Smith is Lecturer in International Finance, College of Law, Syracuse University, and a member of the Bar of the State of New York.
John G. Lay/in is a partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., and a member
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1. See Goldie, supra at 299, 307-08.
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ment of compensation. It was a matter of domestic law. Generally, I
believe that whether there is currently an international law or not is not
as important as whether there should be; and whether there should be
must be answered in the affirmative. I think these are directed at your
final comments, Professor Goldie. These are problems which must be
worked out. I believe that these problems are becoming more complex
because of two rather recent developments involving theories that expropriating countries have utilized in saying they do recognize a requirement for compensation, be it domestic or international, but with certain
deductions. This happened in Peru when the government said once more
that the oil had always been owned by Peru and therefore the government must deduct from the total value which the company establishes
for its properties, the amount of the oil, set at a very arbitrary price
related to the price in east Texas. This was followed several years later
by the Chilean constitutional amendment which required a deduction
for excess profits. Both of these deductions were devices utilized to
assure that the deductions exceeded the amount which the company has
determined as the value of its properties. Both have to be dealt with and
I do not think we have dealt with them very well, because it seems to
allow the countries to say, "Yes, there is an international law," but then
resolve the issue unilaterally and in derogation of future foreign investment probabilities. The capital exporting world has never taken account
of all of the proper elements in determining value; one of those elements
would be reasonable deductions from the amount which the company
sets. The difficulty with the current practice is that the expropriating
nation says, "Go set your amount, and then we will be able to think of
deductions that exceed that amount." This is not a reasonable resolution.
PROF. GOLDIE: I would like to call upon Mr. John Laylin.
MR. LAYLIN: I think a good deal depends on one's point of view. For
instance, after the Russians had taken over private property the Czechs
took some Russian property. The Russians then had a very different
view of what the duties under international law were. The Soviets said
that there had to be just compensation.
The British have an investment in this country of $4.5 billion, the
Canadians $3.5 billion, and the Dutch $2 billion. American companies
are treated well in these countries because they know that if the American companies are not treated according to our concepts oflaw, we can
retaliate. I was very pleased to see that a Middle Eastern state was
making a big investment in an island in Florida. I think that if the
United States would take that island without compensation, we might
hear a different speech as to what the law is.
I recall the first multinational enterprise was the Roman Catholic
Church and I am somewhat embarrassed by the fact that I belong to the
Published by SURFACE, 1974
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Church that succeeded to the properties in England expropriated at the
time of Henry VIII. I have often wondered if Henry VIII would have done
what he did had the British a lot of churches in Italy.
DR. GHOBASHY: I think we should define our terms of reference here.
We should state which aspect of the issue of nationalization or expropriation is a subject of international law. Is it a matter of internal law or
is it a matter of international law? Is the issue of compensation an
international law issue? I think I understand from the discussion, that
some of you have taken the view that the issue of compensation is an
international law question. I take a different view. I think it is an issue
of internal law since we take the position that nationalization is an
internal problem.
PROF. GOLDIE: Dr. Ghobashy, I would like to suggest that there is
no doubt, I think, in most of our minds that down through at least World
War II and including the settlement with the Mexican-British oil claims
in 1946, the general consensus was that expropriations were permitted
in international law, but that prompt, adequate and reasonable compensation was due to be paid as obligatory under international law. This
was an assumption of practically all of the judges of the old Permanent
Court of International Justice in a series of cases with which we are all
familiar. Since that time the situation, rather like the three mile limit,
has been subjected to question. I regard as somewhat disingenuous a
statement by a foreign secretary that "I'll pay you your compensation
but I'll do it because our constitution tells us to, not because international law tells us to," when he knows full well that the recipient will
accept payment in terms, not of the Mexican constitution, but in terms
of what he believes to be his rights (or those of his country) under
international law. There can obviously be no justification of any claim
by Mexico that the Mexican constitution governs that country's international relations with either the United States or the United Kingdom.
So, although the money may be said to be offered under Mexican law,
the transaction is clearly an international law transaction and the obligations arising therefrom are international law transactions. It is rather
like our famous friend Humpty Dumpty saying to Alice that "Words
mean what I intend them to mean, neither more nor less. It is a question
of who is master, that's all."
DR. GHOBASHY: An international contract or international concession agreement made by a state and an individual is not governed by
international law. If there were contracts between two states that would
be a different situation.
PROF. GOLDIE: We are talking about two specific agreements: the
1938 and the 1946 agreement between the Mexican government and the
governments of the United States and United Kingdom .
DR. GHOBASHY: In the Mexican cases, the United States has not
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rested its case on international law, nor have the oil companies based
their case on international law. Instead, they have used the matter of
practice and diplomatic intervention and correspondence. This was particularly true of U.S. foreign relations in 1941 during the discussion with
the American Republics. You can see from the Secretary of State's
position in the discussion with the British that they have taken completely the opposite position from the British and the Dutch in the
Mexican cases, and they have not rested on international law principles.
PROF. GORDON: I believe that the comments by the U.S. Secretary
of State did clearly indicate that international law applied and that it
required prompt, adequate and effective compensation. I am not suggesting that Mexico attempted to say that domestic law was ruling
when international law existed, but rather that in that particular case
there was no generally accepted international law and, therefore, the
next law to be applied was the domestic law. Now the conflict is
whether there was an international law. I would again argue that
whether or not there was international law is not totally relevant today.
I agree very much with Mr. Laylin; that I hope that we can encourage
the flow of foreign money into the United States so that we do find other
nations in a position, when they consider taking over property, of having
their property potentially subject to the same type of action. Indeed, the
funds which were sequestered in U.S. banks subsequent to the expropriation of American property in Eastern Europe following the Second
World War were the bargaining point for resolving those issues. The
resolution of the Eastern European claims by U.S. people came to fruition only because the Europeans had funds in banks in the United
States. I realize that my home state of Florida is being subjected to an
infusion of money by the Arabs in terms of real estate development, and
it really does not bother me at all, as long as our laws are complied with.
I think it is very healthy to have some foreign money coming into this
country. It is extremely unfortunate that already there has been some
reaction by Congressmen, suggesting that we should begin enacting laws
which preclude all this foreign money from coming into the United
States. The flow of foreign capital does not mean that it is coming in to
control the investments. That should be subject to the regulatory processes of Florida and the national laws.
PROF. GOLDIE: Mr Smith, do you have anything to add?
MR. SMITH: Yes, I agree with much of what has been said. I would
like to make a few observations. One observation I would make is that
history, I think, demonstrates that no concessionary agreement will last
unless it is mutually beneficial to both parties concerned, the investing
company and the country of investment. The agreement should be mutually beneficial not only at the beginning when it is initially made, but
for the duration of the concessionary agreement. Therefore, the enlightPublished by SURFACE, 1974
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ened policy would be to recognize this and not to negotiate agreements
which would not be beneficial to everybody concerned.
But, having said all that, I get a little bit irritated by the question
of whether or not there is international law; and if it is a concessionary
agreement with a private company then international law does not
apply anyway. This all relates to the Calvo Doctrine, etc. The fact of
the matter is that while everybody recognizes that a sovereign country
has the right of expropriation, a country can do it reasonably or unreasonably; and if a country does it unreasonably then every effort should
be made by our Government to bring it around to a reasonable course.
I noticed that some speakers today made a distinction between political
and economic considerations. To my way of thinking, this is not a good
distinction, particularly in the area we are talking about now. The governments in most countries are much more active than we are in defending the economic interests of their nationals. I think one of the problems
of this country, such as in the case of extortion for kidnapping and
extortion for hijacking of airplanes, is that historically our Government
has been very weak when there have been unreasonable expropriations.
I am referring specifically to unreasonable arrangements for compensation. Our Government and our State Department have said that these
are economic considerations and that there are more important political
considerations, and consequently have not gone to bat the way governments of other countries have to defend the U.S. interests.
The United States right now is feeding a good part of the
world-providing food for a good part of the world. What would happen
if suddenly the Government would say that we are going to put an
absolute export prohibition on all food, or that we are going to drastically reduce the amount of food that is exported from this country, or
we are going to double the price? You would hear screams all over the
world from people who are getting their food from the United States.
This leads me to believe that in certain essential areas (petroleum is one
and I think food is another) we need to develop procedures and international agreements that would limit the ability of countries to control the
distribution of essential products. Now, I realize that is a difficult problem, but I think it is something that is going to be necessary. I can see
why the Arab countries want to extend their patrimony in the petroleum
industry, and reasonable measures ought to be taken along that line.
The rest of the world, to my way of thinking, has a vested interest in
the flow of petroleum just as they have the same vested interest in the
flow of food from the United States.
PROF. GOLDIE: I think we are getting close to some of the more
difficult and stimulating questions. I would like to see these carried
further by Mr. Richard Young.
MR. YouNG: I should first disclaim, for the record, that I am in any
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss2/11
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way a representative for Aramco here. Aramco is one of my clients. I
hope it will continue to be one, but I am not representing it or any other
of my clients at this meeting.
Professor Goldie's analogy to the law of the sea is, I think, a very
good one. We are perhaps in a state of disintegration with regard to
much of what we had accepted as more or less established international
law. I would just like to make one or two comments in looking to the
future. I do not want to argue at the moment about either the rights or
the wrongs of the past. We have been talking about this problem primarily in terms of security of investment, and have been setting it up as an
issue between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. That
of course, leads to the polarization, which Professor Gordon referred to,
between different social and economic systems. This exacerbates the
whole situation. So I would like to suggest that this is only one aspect
of a much wider problem-the element of good faith in international
transactions. It is not a matter solely of security of investment, but the
security of obligations taken in the broadest sense. That point is one
which is applicable regardless of the economic systems, the social systems, the states or the private entities involved. If you are going to have
a viable economic order you have to be able to rely on engagements that
have been entered into in good faith. That is just as true in a deal
between Czechoslovakia and Russia as it is between Exxon and Libya.
Don't misunderstand me. I think that a state or government is
perfectly free to have any kind of social system it wants, subject to
certain obligations with respect to human rights and matters of that
kind. A government can enter into or not enter into any agreements or
undertakings as it sees fit. But I think that once these agreements are
made, the obligation to perform in good faith should be universally
recognized. I am assuming, of course, that the agreements are reasonably fair when they are first made, and I think that perhaps some of the
older concession agreements could be open to criticisms of that kind.
There also may be a question of undue prolongation of agreements. But
I can see, after all the present furor is over, a new realization by all
parties of the need to bargain i:h good faith and to agree in good faith
and to perform in good faith, and I like to think that good advice from
competent counsel on both sides would be helpful to everybody.
PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you very much Mr. Young. I now would like
to call upon Mr. Haight to give us his views on this problem that we
are facing: if everyone is going to be a lover then whose word is to be
relied on? We are learning that even Uncle Sam may be in this position
if islands are bought by Saudi Arabia in Florida.
MR. HAIGHT: I think, as others have said, that when there is a
breakdown in social relationships we must get back to basic principles.
The principle of dealing in good faith is basic in any society. FundamenPublished by SURFACE, 1974
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tally, we have to decide whether we believe in a system of private property. When you invest in a communist country you do not expect that
your investment will get the same treatment as it would in a country
such as Canada. Obviously we are in a state of flux. A great many of
the new countries that are emerging are choosing whether to follow the
road of a private or public property system. There is a good deal of
mixture everywhere. Dealings between countries, just like dealings between people, must be based on certain fundamentals that if an agreement is made in good faith, one expects that the agreement will be lived
up to. That basic principle was recognized in the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty in 1962. Dr. Ghobashy mentioned that in 1952, ten
years earlier, when this question first came up, the United States attempted to get a recognition of this principle in international law and
that resolution was rejected. But it is interesting that ten years later, in
1962, recognition of international law was included in the Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty, number (XVII) 1803. This resolution was negotiated with the representative of Chile. He was asked whether he accepted the principle of observance of private contracts in good faith. He
said, "Yes, I do," and it was written into the permanent sovereignty
resolution.
These principles are presently in a state of flux and constantly
under attack, but I think that we have got to arrive at a consensus
somewhow, as we hope to do in the law of the sea. But surely governments, like private individuals, can agree on a basic principle: that
where there is disagreement, perfectly honest, sincere, legitimate disagreement, there should be a tribunal, some means of settling that disagreement and not just leaving it to a power play. Whether the oil companies are more powerful than the governments or the governments are
more powerful seems to me irrelevant. Disputes ought to be settled not
by power but by arbitration, by a decision of a judicial authority. That
has been recognized for some time. The World Bank set up a system for
settling disputes and there are now some 70 countries that adhere to that
convention. It is incredible that every country doesn't agree to submit
disputes to a tribunal.
I will just close by saying that for many years I was associated with
the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, one of the earliest and biggest of all the
multinational groups in the world. Wherever it possibly can in its dealings with governments, it tries to persuade the government to accept
settlement of disputes by the World Bank Center. In a great many
instances it has been successful. Now we do not read about that, nor do
we see how disputes are settled before they go to arbitration. However,
there is a tremendous amount that does go on below the surface that is
very encouraging. I hope that more of that will come about.
PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you very much Mr. Haight. I see Dr. Ghohttps://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss2/11
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bashy has been writing some notes and I would like him to share them
with the rest of us.
DR. GHOBASHY: I listened carefully to Mr. Young and I think I agree
with him about the old concessions having been unfair. Many of these
countries did not have old concessions, did not even have any laws on
oil, and had no knowledge and no educated people to actually engage
in meaningful negotiations with the oil companies. Actually the new
concessions have been made with the benefit of all the experience the
oil producing countries have acquired by exchanging ideas on the law
of oil with each other.
I will also say that there is no dispute really as to compensation at
the present time. There is a difference between the Middle-Eastern oil
producing countries and Mexico and the Latin American countries.
These latter countries would nationalize their industries but have no
money to pay compensation. There is no adequate, prompt, or effective
compensation to be made. But there are countries who have made agreements and who have negotiated in good faith, such as Saudi Arabia for
instance, who negotiated an agreement with Aramco and paid $500
million for a 25 percent share of Aramco. If we take the area as a whole,
you will find that the negotiations have been successful and were mutual, with complete understanding between the oil companies and the
oil producing nations. Take Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other Persian
Gulf States as examples indicating that this is no problem.
Now the issue of arbitration is a matter that can be incorporated
into contracts, but these contracts, I believe, do not call for arbitration.
Whenever the contracts have called for arbitration, there has been arbitration in the Middle East. I am sure that Mr. Young would tell us about
some of the arbitrations with Aramco and Saudi Arabia on the border
issues and so forth. There are new contracts now which provide that the
country will not nationalize industry within a certain period of time. I
do not think elements of good faith have to enter here. I do not see how
much value can be attached to a mere statement in a contract that the
country will engage itself not to nationalize for a specific period of time.
What will happen if that particular government is overthrown, and we
get a more revolutionary government which does not agree with its predecessor? I think that immediate nationalization would take place. I
think Mr. Haight mentioned something about using the World Bank
Center. I do not think the World Bank is the proper machinery for the
settlement of disputes. There has not been much use of international
arbitration because the feeling has been that this was not a dispute
under international law. We have the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dispute in which the international court said that this was a matter of
domestic jurisdiction. The Security Council also felt that this was a
matter of Iranian domestic jurisdiction when the matter was before it.
Published by SURFACE, 1974
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PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you Dr. Ghobashy. I am looking at some
people in the audience whom I feel we should draw into the discussion.
-Luke Finlay, you have been writing notes too. Do you have some comments to add at this time?
MR. FINLAY: First, I would like to say that I am totally in agreement
with Mr. Young and against Dr. Ghobashy on the question of whether
countries have an absolute right to nationalize. As a matter of customary international law, a state, like an individual, is expected to live up
to agreements freely entered into. It is recognized that there may be
overriding public purposes that require expropriation in the case of the
state as a party which would not apply between two private parties, but
absent some overriding public purpose the historic outlook has certainly
been that states should live up to agreements just like private individuals, provided the agreements are freely entered into. As I pointed out
this morning, with the widespread information about bargaining agreements on concession terms all over the world, instant communication
of every agreement, and the availability of experts, there is not a developing nation in the world that does not have access to expertise in
making agreements. If the developing nations expect to attract foreign
capital in a tightening capital market they are just going to have to
develop some way of living up to their agreements.
I have some figures here from the First National City Bank that
show that because of the huge capital outlays that are required, the ratio
of current assets to current liabilities is constantly falling. 2 It is too bad
Mr. Cookenboo had to leave because he could comment on this. These
companies are getting into a constantly tighter position. Exxon, for
example, had earnings of about $2.5 billion in 1973 but also shows capital outlays of almost $4 billion for 197 4. The capital outlay of the industry is more than the cash flow after payment of dividends with the result
that long-term debt is a steadily increasing percentage of total capitalization and the ratio of current assets to current liabilities is steadily
decreasing. As shown in the report of the First National City Bank that
I have just mentioned, this ratio declined from better than 2 to 1in1962
to about 3 to 2 in 1972. The obvious impetus as capital gets tighter and
tighter will be to look at the places where you have some reasonable
assurance of getting a fair return. It can cost up to $20 or $30 billion or
more to go into a new country looking for oil. If you find nothing, the
total burden is on the oil companies. If you find something, recent
experience has been that you immediately have to make a new
deal-not on the basis of a return geared to the high degree of risk that
had been accepted in the initiation of the venture, but on the basis of
2. Energy Memo, Petroleum Department, First National City Bank, Vol. IX, No. 4,
October 1973, at 4.
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the discoveries that have been made as if they had been a certainty from
the start. 3 Until individual countries begin to show some restraint in this
regard and to develop some sense of responsibility towards their commitments, people with available capital are going to start looking in
other areas. It is just a matter of self-help as far as I am concerned. I
totally agree with your comments that as long as you have no law on
this subject it is going to be "devil take the hindmost," and the United
States and other countries are going to have to be looking at ways and
means of protecting themselves if they cannot look to recognized principles of international law that cover the subject.
DR. GHOBASHY: I did not think I had much disagreement with Mr.
Young. He did not say that he does not believe in expropriation, so there
is not much disagreement. Of course, you are taking the position that
international contracts are more valuable than the right of expropriation. I do not say that one should take precedence over the other. They
both are of equal value. But we should not tilt one in favor of the other.
The other point that you made is that maybe there should be two agreements: one before they discover the oil and one after they discover the
oil. Maybe that is the solution.
MR. FINLAY: That is what we have today. That is what the trouble
is.
PROF. GOLDIE: I would like to call on Mr. Haight.
MR. HAIGHT: I would like to ask Dr. Ghobashy this question. Getting away entirely from the old form of concession contract and looking
to the future where the oil companies will be buying oil from the government on a long-term contractual basis, what assurance will the oil companies have that the governments will live up to those contracts? Do you
agree that there ought to be some procedures for dealing with differences
as they arise? In view of the importance of oil to the countries of Europe
3. An editorial in THE OIL & GAS J., Aug. 5, 1974, at 23, expresses identical views. In
commenting on a United Kingdom Government White Paper proposing greater government involvement in both existing and new petroleum ventures, the editorial has this to
say:
. . . the government approach repeats a familiar pattern set by other countries
who have cut themselves a share of oil assets either by seizure, nationalization,
or participation. Operators were welcomed in with their capital and technology
to take the initial risks. Then when oil and gas were discovered and hefty profits
appeared assured, the governments moved in .
The United Kingdom white paper expresses this familiar concern for "high
profits" and proposes to get a greater share of them for the government and to
assert greater control over operations.
. . . Disregard for [the issues involved] would be far more traumatic for a
nation like Britain where honoring terms of a contract is basic to the nation's
economic history. How Britain handles this matter will determine the attitude
of private investors in developing not only Britain's offshore resources but also
those elsewhere where sanctity of contract is still alive.
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and Japan and all over the world, are not these contracts affected with
a vital international interest and, when disputes arise, should not the
adjudicating body be independent of both the buyer and the seller? Why
wouldn't an international tribunal like the World Bank, or the International Chamber of Commerce, or some other organization providing
neutral adjudication, be appropriate?
DR. GHOBASHY: The first point is that the marketing would be in the
hands of the oil company because the oil producing countries cannot
market the oil. I think it is well established that the oil companies have
control of the markets and they would have the backing of the countries
of which they are nationals. The second point is the tendency of the oil
consuming countries to have state-run agencies which deal with the oil
producing countries in buying the oil. It seems in that case that it is
clearly an international law issue. As to the arbitration, I fully agree
with you. There should be arbitration clauses in these new arrangements and, of course, it is the duty of the international community,
particularly the United Nations, to take that issue under consideration.
But there should be some treaties negotiated with the different governments regarding arbitration, because this does not involve controlling
the production of oil, but a sale; a contract of sale abroad which has
more or less taken the issue out of the sovereignty over natural resources
into another issue of a contract of sale abroad in the other countries.
MR. LAYLIN: One thing that has not been touched upon, which I
think is at the back of everyone's mind, is the pity of taking property
from a company or an individual because you are mad at something that
his country has done. Libya has taken the concessions away from the
concessioners because Iran put troops in one of the islands of the Persian
Gulf. Now if the United States withholds credits to a country that is not
living up to some of its obligations, we are immediately accused of
economic aggression, and yet something as vital as fuel is cut off because
of some political thing. When India and Pakistan were at war over the
secession of East Pakistan, I asked if the Indians had cut down on the
water that flows from India into Pakistan. Both sides said: "Of course
not. That water is too important. You cannot do that no matter how
mad you are at one another." Now one practical way that is developing
of curtailing somewhat this sort of taking is to have joint ventures in
which you join nationals of many countries, as in the case of the Kennecott Copper Corporation in the investment it is going to make in recovering manganese nodules from the ocean floor. It has formed a consortium
with a West German company, an English company, a Japanese company, and possibly a French company. Similarly there is a very large
investment going on in Peru which has not been an awfully good investment risk in recent years. These companies are willing to take the risk
because there is heavy investment from four to five different countries
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss2/11
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and there is a feeling that Peru is not going to try to take on all of those
countries at the same time. In that sense, I think these joint ventures
are a very desirable thing.
MR. SMITH: I think it is probably obvious, that when you think
about the yield on capital in the United States and all the risks that are
involved in foreign investment, the yield on foreign investment must be
substantially more than what can be achieved here, otherwise the investment will not be made. I think that there is an education process
that needs to occur. These developing countries are going through a
nationalistic period that the advanced countries went through some
time ago. Their citizens do not really realize these things and one of the
things I would like to see is some kind of an educational program, maybe
through the vehicle of the United Nations, to make these people understand some of the dollar and cents facts that have been brought out by
various speakers here today.
PROF. GORDON: I have a couple of final comments-one on the joint
venture. I think this is exactly where we are heading, not only with the
equity participation but also with the financing. Companies are turning
more to such organizations as ADELA, the international financial consortium, and indeed the Peruvian government was hesitant in expropriating a couple of ventures which had financing by ADELA after the
takeover of the IPC properties. With respect to arbitration, I see it as
an important source of settling some of the contractual disputes. But, I
do not expect it to be widely accepted in Latin America. Regretfully, the
Latin American nations have not entered into the international convention. Indeed, in the Andean Common Market, increased polarization is
represented by a legislative provision saying that arbitration may not
take place outside the market. This comes both from some historically
bad experiences with arbitration, as well as from an overly emotional
nationalistic reaction. One thing that I think is good, and it is somewhat
similar to the comment made that the water was not cut off-it is too
important! Indeed, although we cannot reach a conclusion as to the
international law, it does avoid more serious forms of retaliation. I think
Professor Goldie's comments regarding the analogy of the law of the sea
are quite useful and, perhaps we can resolve the entire matter by turning
this trade issue over to him, and suggesting that in his work with the
international organizations that when they do reach a resolution dealing
with the sea that he simply propose the addition "and trade" to appear
wherever the word "sea" appears. We thus could perhaps have the entire
matter resolved.
MR. YouNG: I might add a footnote on arbitration. There has been
difficulty, particularly in recent years, in securing effective arbitration
agreements between governments and private entities. It is considered
demeaning in many countries for the government to enter into such an
Published by SURFACE, 1974

13

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 2 [1974], Art. 11

1974]

Panel Discussion

323

agreement with a private company. But one can see, I think, quite
recently some encouraging signs that whereas the government of an oil
producing country will not accept an arbitration agreement, its state
petroleum agency, whether it is a national oil company or something
else, will quite often be willing to enter into an arbitration agreement
with a private company. I know of at least one example in Saudi Arabia
in which it is provided that the arbitration will be conducted under the
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.
One other footnote about the importance o~things too important to
interfere with. The trans-Arabian pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the
Mediterranean crosses a section of the Golan Heights which has been
in Israeli hands since 1967. The pipeline has not been interfered with
by Israel even through the recent war.
PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you very much.
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